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2Introduction1
The Dominican Republic (DR) has committed itself to work towards reaching the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Recent data indicate that the DR has 
made considerable progress on the MDGs but that an acceleration of efforts is needed for 
the country to reach all the goals.2 This chapter focuses on two key questions: Will the 
DR achieve all of the MDGs under current policies and trends? If not, what policy 
changes are needed to achieve the MDGs and at what cost? The second question 
incorporates alternative assumptions about the sources (domestic or foreign) of required 
additional government financing. We address these questions using MAMS (MAquette 
for MDG Simulations3), a dynamic-recursive computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model for country strategy analysis, and a micro-simulation model. Such an 
economywide approach is needed given that the simulated policy changes have strong 
effects throughout the economy.
Section 1 below provides background on the general economy and MDGs since 1990. 
Section 2 presents our methods and database, and Section 3 the simulations and an 
analysis of their results. Section 4 concludes with a summary of our main findings.
1. Economic Performance and MDG Trends
Table 1 summarizes the performance of the DR economy for 1990-2004, comparing it to 
the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) Region. For the period as a whole, growth in 
the DR was rapid and quite even across the main sectors although strongest in services, 
followed by industry and lastly agriculture. These tendencies are also reflected in similar 
                                                
1 Carolina Diaz-Bonilla and Hans Lofgren are respectively with the Poverty and Gender Division for Latin 
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2 UN (2004).
3 Lofgren and Diaz-Bonilla (2006). 
3employment shifts by sector. In addition, the population became increasingly urban. 
Relative to GDP, private consumption declined. The share of final demand absorbed by 
the government increased although, relative to the LAC region as a whole, this share is 
still below average – in 2004, the GDP share for the sum of government consumption and 
investment was 13.7% for the DR and 16.1% for the LAC region. The trade deficit 
Table 1. Growth and structural change in the DR and the LAC Region, 1990-2004.
Real growth per Real growth per
Item 1990 2004  year 1990-2004* 1990 2004  year 1990-2004*
GDP at market prices 100.0 100.0 4.8 100.0 100.0 2.9
Consumption 84.7 75.4 3.7 78.4 76.0 2.8
Private 80.4 66.6 3.6 66.7 61.7 2.9
Public 4.3 8.9 4.9 11.6 14.3 1.7
Investment 25.1 24.3 5.3 19.4 21.1 4.0
Fixed 24.9 24.0 5.2 15.7
Private 19.0 19.1 5.7 13.4
Public 5.9 4.9 4.2 2.3
Stock change 0.2 0.3 10.9
Exports 33.8 49.3 6.7 17.1 25.6 7.2
Imports 43.7 49.0 4.9 14.8 22.7 8.1
Trade Openness 77.5 98.2 31.9 48.4
FDI (net) 1.9 3.5 0.8 3.0
Transfers (net) 5.2 13.5
Official 0.8 0.7
Private 4.5 12.8
Foreign Debt (US$ billion) 4.4 7.0 0.7 444.6 779.0
% of exports 195.8 59.0 240.2 131.1
% of GNI 64.7 40.5 42.2 40.1
Tax revenue** 10.3 14.7 12.3
Goods and services 2.7 6.9 5.0
Income 2.6 4.1 3.4
Trade 4.9 3.5 2.9
Other 0.2 0.3 1.0
Public spending
Education na 1.1
Health** na 2.3
Value-added (% of total) 100.0 100.0 4.5 100.1 100.0 2.67
Agriculture 13.4 11.6 3.8 9.0 8.5 2.20
Industry 31.4 29.5 4.4 35.8 34.0 2.75
Services 55.2 58.8 5.3 55.4 57.5 2.70
Employment (% of total)** 100.0 100.0 2.6 100.0 100.0 2.7
Agriculture 20.3 14.1 0.3 18.3 17.7 2.1
Industry 22.9 22.6 1.8 25.9 21.7 1.5
Services 56.7 63.4 3.5 55.9 60.6 3.7
Household consumption p/cap (US$2000) 1420.4 1726.8 1.4 2093.2 2500.2 1.3
Population (million) 7.1 8.8 1.9 437.6 544.1 1.6
Rural (%) 44.8 34.1 -0.4 29.1 23.2
Urban (%) 55.2 65.9 2.8 70.9 76.8
Migrants abroad (% of population)** 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.7
Notes: *Real growth refers to growth in constant LCU, dollars, or physical units (not growth in the share of a total).
**Tax revenue and health spending data: 2003; migrants abroad data: 2000; 1990 employment data: 1991.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006
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declined (as a % of GDP) and was close to zero in 2004 as real export growth exceeded 
import growth over time with similar price changes (in foreign currency). The economy 
4became more open to trade.4 Private transfers from abroad grew in importance. Although 
at a much lower level, growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was also respectable. 
According to standard indicators, external debt sustainability improved drastically. Trade 
taxes (almost exclusively on imports) became less important and domestic taxes more so.
As shown in Figure 1, other than 1990 and the temporary slowdown in 1993-1994, the 
1990s saw rapid growth. This success and the overall quite positive changes during the 
1990s may at least in part be attributed to a macroeconomic stabilization and structural 
adjustment program, which was launched in 1990 and encouraged increased openness 
driven by FDI in Free-Trade Zones (FTZs) and tourism (Figure 2).5 The new millennium 
got off to a less shining start. Although the slow-down was induced by exogenous shocks 
(including the increase in oil prices and the negative impact of September 11 on tourism), 
it was aggravated by domestic factors. The latter included an expansion of government 
deficits and the monetary base (partly driven by a crisis in the banking and electricity 
sectors). Fiscal restraint restricted social sector spending, which is central to MDG 
achievements. In the wake of the 2003 crisis, policy makers were also concerned about 
the ability of the FTZ and tourism sectors to sustain rapid growth in the future. For the 
FTZs, stiff competition from world textile markets is a particular cause of concern.
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4 Trade openness, measured as the percent of the sum of exports and imports in GDP, has varied quite 
strongly on a year-to-year basis in response to variability in the exchange rate, exports, and imports. 
Nevertheless, for the period 1990-2005 (and 1990-2004) the trend is toward increased openness. 
5 Aristy-Escuder (1999). 
5Table 2 provides additional information about the structure of the DR economy in 2004. 
Services (dominated by the private sector) have the largest shares of value-added and 
employment, followed by industry and then agriculture. The FTZs represent a large share 
of industry, so as a result, industry exports a large share of its output. The size of the 
FTZs and their heavy reliance on imported industrial intermediates contribute to the fact 
that a large share of domestic demand for industrial commodities is satisfied via imports. 
Industry is therefore highly integrated with the international economy and accounts for 
most exports and imports, although exports are also important for private services. On the 
contrary, (unprocessed) agricultural products are not traded to any significant extent.
sector domestic
output demand met
Sector value-added employment export import for exports by imports
Agriculture 11.4 14.1 2.1 1.9 6.1 7.9
Industry 25.7 22.6 60.4 91.9 46.9 59.2
Services - government 5.1 16.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
education - primary 0.5 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
education - secondary 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
education - tertiary 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
health 0.8 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
water-sanitation 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
other infrastructure 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
other 3.2 11.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Services - private 57.9 46.4 37.5 6.2 42.9 4.8
education - primary 0.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
education - secondary 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
education - tertiary 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
health 2.2 3.9 1.0 0.0 19.9 0.0
other 54.6 39.8 36.4 6.2 23.0 4.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 29.8 31.5
Source: MAMS database -- SAM for 2004 and employment data.
Share in
Share of
Table 2. Structure of value-added, employment and trade in the DR, 2004 (%).
Table 3 shows data for key MDG indicators in 1990 (MDG values for this year determine 
most MDG targets) and 2004 (the base year for our analysis), as well as the 2015 target 
values. As shown, MDG 7b has already been achieved. Assuming that past trends
61990a 2004a 2015b
MDG 1: Poverty Rate (% of population)c 28.6 43.1 14.3
MDG 2: Primary School Completion Rate (% of relevant cohort)d 22 53 100
MDG 4: Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 births) 58 38 19
MDG 5: Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 229 178 57
MDG 7a: Access to safe water (% of population) 83 86 91.5
MDG 7b: Access to improved sanitation (% of population) 60 90 80
Note: a. Nearest available year if data is not available for 1990 or 2004; b. Relative to the values for 1990, the 2015 targets 
are: cut MDG1 by half, MDG 4 by 2/3, and MDG 5 by 3/4; cut by half the shares of the population without access to water 
and sanitation (MDGs 7a and 7b); and achieve 100% completion (or close to this) for MDG 2; c. The poverty rate in 1990 
column is for 1998 – see text for a discussion. d. The 1990 and 2004 values correspond to the (strict) definition of the 
completion rate: the proportion of students of the correct age cohort (i.e., no out-of-cohort older students) that enter first 
grade and successfully complete on-time (i.e., without repeating) all 8 grades of primary school.
Table 3. Key MDG Indicators for the Dominican Republic.
7continue, MDGs 4 and 7a would be close to being achieved (by 2015) whereas, in spite 
of considerable progress, full achievement of MDGs 2 and 5 may be more difficult. The 
poverty figure in the 1990 column is the World Bank’s poverty estimate for 1998 based 
on the cost of basic needs method (World Bank, 2001).6 The 2004 estimate of 43.1% is 
based on the most recent Poverty Assessment for the DR using the same estimation 
method, but also correcting for income problems in the survey (World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank, 2006).7,8 The extreme poverty rate for 2004 was estimated 
at 16.2%. For comparison, using instead the international $1PPP (purchasing power 
parity) line, the extreme 
poverty rate was about 
3.3% in 2004.
Inequality, measured by 
the Gini coefficient, has 
been stable over time. 
Compared to other 
countries in the LAC 
region, inequality is relatively low (see Figure 3). From a more disaggregated 
perspective, the achievements in rural areas are lagging for all of these indicators. For 
example, according to Dauhajre et al. (1994), the 1992 headcount rates were at 30% in 
rural areas and 11% in urban areas. The WB-IDB headcount poverty rates for 2004 (post-
2003 crisis) were 57.5% in rural areas and 35% in urban areas – showing that more than 
half the rural population is poor (WB-IDB, 2006). Similarly, performance is weaker in 
rural areas in terms of rates of school completion, mortality, and access to water and 
sanitation (UN, 2004).
                                                
6 The lack of poverty data is symptomatic of a general lack of data on the evolution of MDG indicators over 
time, making it difficult to evaluate policies and prioritize actions. Strengthening the institutional 
framework of the national statistical system is listed among the DR’s challenges and priorities (UN, 2004).
7 The cost of the basic basket of goods for the poverty and extreme poverty line were estimated using the 
DR’s national living conditions survey (ENCOVI) for April 2004, and family incomes were estimated 
using a labor force survey (Encuesta de Fuerza Trabajo – ENFT) for 2000-2006 (WB-IDB, 2006).
8 The ENFT was not designed to measure household income (underestimates it) or poverty (overestimates 
it). Therefore, the WB-IDB Poverty Assessment corrects problems such as missing remittances income.
Source: SEDLAC (2006).Note: Latest available year for each country.
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Figure 3: Gini coefficient household per capita income  
LAC countries
8The DR has eliminated inequality in school attendance disfavoring women – if the MDG 
for gender equality in schooling is defined with this target, then it is already achieved. In 
2001/02, females were more strongly represented than males at all levels. For 6-13 year 
olds – the primary age cohort – the 2001/02 attendance rates are 87% for girls versus 
84% for boys. For 14-17 year olds – the secondary age cohorts – the difference was even 
larger with female attendance at 40% and male attendance at 29% (ENDESA, 2002). 
However, at higher levels of education, women are overrepresented in fields where 
graduates earn lower salaries like secretarial studies and nursing. 
MDG 1 (poverty reduction) will mainly be affected by increases in employment and labor 
incomes that, in turn, depend on the rate and pattern of economic growth. For the other 
MDGs, accelerated progress requires increased provision of sector-specific services and 
related investments, especially in rural areas (UN, 2004). For example, in primary 
education (MDG 2), improved educational quality and expanded capacity are the keys to 
necessary increases in entry rates and reductions in dropout and (most importantly for the 
DR) repetition rates.9 Increases in the number of primary school graduates will lead to 
growing demand for secondary and tertiary education, requiring expansion also at these 
higher levels.10 With regard to MDGs 4 and 5, the government has noted that reduced 
mortality rates require improvements in basic health knowledge, immunization programs, 
obstetric care, and in the supervision of births by health workers. Accordingly, the 
government has in recent years launched a series of programs aimed at reducing poverty 
and making progress in other MDG areas (UN, 2004).11
                                                
9 Because of late entry and especially because of high repetition rates, 20.7% of students are on average 3 
or more years older than the correct age cohort for primary school (UN, 2004).
10 In the DR, primary education is eight years, followed by four years each of secondary and tertiary cycles.
11 Recent government programs include: “Programa de Inversión Social” (February 2001), “Plan Nacional 
de Alimentación y Nutrición 1998-2005”, “Estrategia Nacional para la Reducción de la Pobreza” (June 
2003), and “Comer es Primero” (October 2004).
92. Methodology and data
Our quantitative analysis is based on MAMS, a dynamic-recursive computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, and a microsimulation model. The simulations are done for the 
period 2004-2015. MAMS integrates a relatively standard dynamic-recursive computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model with an additional MDG module that links MDG 
indicators to a set of determinants. To be able to make this link, MAMS has a relatively 
detailed treatment of (a) government activities and private sector activities in health and 
education; and (b) MDG outcomes as a function of relevant services (provided by the 
government and private sectors) and other determinants. We follow the sequential “top-
down” approach suggested by Robilliard et al. (2001) in order to link MAMS with the 
microsimulation model. For a detailed description of MAMS and the microsimulation 
model, see Chapters ?? and ??, respectively, in this volume. We will here only describe 
the DR-specific database for both models. 
The Dominican Republic MAMS is based on a 2004 disaggregated Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) (estimated for this project), and other supplementary data (explained 
below). Table 4 shows the accounts in the SAM, which in this and other applications of 
MAMS determine the disaggregation of the model. The government is disaggregated into 
seven activities: three 
types of education 
(primary, secondary, and 
tertiary cycles), health, 
water-sanitation, (other) 
infrastructure, and other 
government services. 
Because of our focus on 
MDG issues, the private 
service sector is 
disaggregated into three 
education activities (also 
split along the primary, 
Activities/Commodities (14) Institutions (3) Investment Accounts
Private (7) Household Private (1)
Agriculture Government Government (7)
Industry Rest of World Primary Education
Private Services* Secondary Education
Primary Education Tertiary Education
Secondary Education Savings Accounts (3) Health
Tertiary Education Household Water and Sanitation
Health Government Other Public Infrastructure
Government (7) Rest of World Other Government Services
Primary Education
Secondary Education Capital Accounts (3) Other Accounts (2)
Tertiary Education Household Domestic Interest Payments
Health Government Foreign Interest Payments
Water and Sanitation Rest of World
Other Public Infrastructure
Other Government Services
Factors of Production (5) Tax Accounts (4)
Unskilled Labor Direct taxes
Semi-skilled Labor Export taxes
Skilled Labor Import taxes
Land Other indirect taxes
Private Capital
*Non-education, non-health
Table 4: Accounts in the DR 2004 Social Accounting Matrix
10
secondary, and tertiary cycles) and a private health activity. This is especially important 
in the DR and most other Latin American countries, where private provision of education 
and health are important components of the total level of services. The rest of the 
economy is disaggregated into agriculture, industry, and private non-education non-health 
services. For these sectors, output is exported and sold domestically, competing with 
imports.
Among the factors of production, there are three types of labor: those with less than 
completed secondary education (unskilled), with completed secondary education but 
incomplete tertiary (semi-skilled), and with complete tertiary (skilled). Each of these 
labor types is therefore linked directly to the education sectors/cycles, and thus the 
growth in the labor force will in part depend on the functioning of the education system 
in the model. The remaining factors include public capital stocks by government activity, 
a private capital stock, and land.
The institutions include the government, a household (the private domestic institution that 
represents both households and domestic enterprises), and the rest of the world. Each 
institution has its own savings and capital accounts. Taxes have been disaggregated into 
direct, import, export, and other indirect taxes. There is one private investment account 
and seven public investment accounts (for each government sector). Lastly, the model 
includes accounts for domestic and foreign interest payments.
The 2004 disaggregated micro SAM for the DR was created in several steps. First, a 
macro SAM for the country was created using the national accounts, balance of payments 
accounts, and government fiscal data for 2004 (see Table A.1)12. These data sources were 
reconciled and the macro SAM balanced. Second, the capital accounts for the 
government and the balance of payments were used to disaggregate the savings-
investment account of the macro SAM. The income and expenditure fiscal accounts, 
supplemented by data from a 2004 Public Expenditure Review (World Bank, 2004a), 
                                                
12 Data sources include the World Development Indicators, World Bank; Banco Central de la República 
Dominicana; Oficina Nacional de Presupuesto, República Dominicana; and Departamento Internacional, 
Subdirección de Balanza de Pagos, República Dominicana.  
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provided the information to split the government into the different sectors of interest for 
our MDG analysis. A Supply and Use Table for 2001/2002 provided data for the Input-
Output table, as well as taxes and overall value-added (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas –
ONE, 2002). Census data and labor force surveys were used to generate information on 
value added by labor type and sector (ONE, 2002 and 2004). Finally, the SAM was 
balanced using cross-entropy estimation techniques.
Apart from the SAM, the MAMS database includes data related to the different MDGs, 
the labor market, and various elasticities. Most importantly, the first two data types 
include levels of service delivery required to meet the different MDGs, stocks of students 
at different educational levels, stocks of labor by skill (educational achievement), and 
student behavioral patterns in terms of graduation rates and other indicators. The 
elasticities include those in production, trade, consumption, and in the different MDG 
functions (see Table A.2). The elasticities for the MDG functions are informed by a study 
done for the DR by the Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales 
(CEDLAS) at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata.13 Reflecting these results, Table 5 
shows the determinants in the MAMS functions that define MDG outcomes and the 
corresponding full elasticities used in the model.
MDG
Service 
Delivery
Per-Capita 
Household 
Consumption
Wage 
Incentives
Public 
Infrastructure
Other MDGs
2 Primary Education
First Grade Entry Rate 0.221 0.074 0.007 0.074 -0.066      (mdg4)
Passing Rates 0.228 0.076 0.076 0.076 -0.053      (mdg4)
Continuation Rates 6.64 16.60 9.96 16.60 -6.64       (mdg4)
4 Under-5 Mortality -0.789 -0.079 -0.079 -0.158 (mdg7a,b)
5 Maternal Mortality -1.210 -0.121 -0.121 -0.121 (mdg7a,b)
7a Access to Safe Water 0.091 0.018 0.009
7b Access to Basic Sanitation 0.023 0.002 0.005
Note: MAMS has a two-level system to estimate MDG outcomes (see Chapter 3 in this volume for details). The "full" elasticities reported in 
this table represent the multiplication of the lower and upper level elasticities: i.e., the elasticity of the final MDG value with respect to the 
intermediate MDG value, times the elasticity of the intermediate MDG value with respect to the determinant listed in the columns above.  In 
addition, the elasticities are location specific (in this case computed at the base year), therefore the closer the base year value of the MDG 
is to its target, the smaller the elasticity becomes.
Table 5. Elasticities for the determinants of non-poverty MDGs.
                                                
13 Cicowiez and Tornarolli (2006). The probit regression results from this study are available on request.
Rather than use the exact point estimates from the econometric partial equilibrium analysis, we use the 
relative importance of the determinants in choosing the (general equilibrium) elasticities in Table 5. Given 
we require general equilibrium elasticities, we also take into account several research reports that highlight 
the importance of certain determinants for the DR’s strategy (UN, 2004;  WB, 2004a; and WB-IDB, 2006). 
Sensitivity analysis for the elasticities (for a range of values in line with these various reports) shows that 
the overall qualitative results and messages do not change.
12
The determinants include the delivery of relevant services (in education, health, and 
water-sanitation) and other indicators, also allowing for the presence of synergies 
between MDGs, i.e. the fact that achievements in terms of one MDG can have an impact 
on other MDGs. Outside education, service delivery for other MDGs is expressed relative 
to the size of the population. For MDG 2 the treatment is slightly more complex. The 
arguments in Table 5 determine the shares of children that enter primary school (out of 
the cohort of six-year olds), and successfully complete their current grade (out of those 
enrolled). The shares that repeat their current grade or drop out from it are determined 
residually. The service level is measured per enrolled student, an indicator of educational 
quality. MDG 4 is included as a proxy for the health status of those enrolled. Wage 
incentives, an indicator of payoffs from continued education, are expressed as the ratio 
between the wages for labor at the next higher and the current levels of education. 
MDG 2 is defined as the net (or on-time) completion rate. Given that primary school in 
the DR is eight years, the MDG target for 2015 requires that all (or very close to all) in 
the relevant cohort enter school by 2008 and successfully pass their current grade each 
year from 2008-2015. In other words, the MDG 2 indicator for 2015 is defined as the 
product of the 2008 grade 1 entry rate and the passing rates for 2008-2015. For the 
secondary and tertiary cycles, the same set of arguments enter functions that determine 
the shares of enrolled students that pass as well as the shares of graduates from the 
previous cycle that enter the first grade of these two cycles. The only difference is that the 
arguments for services (per enrolled student) and wage incentives are redefined to be 
relevant to these higher cycles. Across the board, the functions for education and the 
other MDGs have been calibrated to assure that, under base-year conditions, base-year
performance is replicated and that, under a set of other conditions identified by sector 
studies, the target is fully achieved.14
                                                
14 The Dominican Republic’s National Planning Office utilized the Needs Assessment tool developed by 
the Millennium Project to cost the MDGs. (Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia, ONAPLAN, Modelo de 
Costos US$ Objetivo del Milenio.) The sectoral costing information for education, health, water-sanitation, 
and infrastructure provided the initial conditions for the calibration. All other determinants momentarily 
13
The microsimulation model was applied to data from the ENFT – the main household 
survey in the DR. This survey has been conducted since 1991 by the Banco Central de la 
República Dominicana. It is nationally representative with a sample size of more than 
20,000 inhabitants. 
3. Simulations and Results
This section presents the simulations and analyzes the results for both MAMS and the 
microsimulation model. The first simulation (BASE) addresses the question of whether 
the DR will achieve all of the MDGs under current policies and trends (Section 4a). The 
rest of the simulations (Section 4b) focus on the second question: Given that, as we will 
see, most MDGs are not achieved under a business-as-usual scenario, what policy 
changes are needed to achieve the MDGs and what are the costs and economywide 
effects of trying to achieve the MDGs? These 
simulations focus on one MDG at a time and 
then on all MDGs together. Each will be run 
under alternative assumptions about the source 
of any additional financing that is needed: 
foreign grants (fg), foreign borrowing (fb), 
domestic taxes (tax), or domestic borrowing 
(db) (see Table 6 for the definitions).
4a. Base Scenario
The BASE simulation is a business-as-usual scenario. Specific MDG targets are not 
pursued, and existing policies are left in place. For this simulation, the exogenous part of 
TFP growth is adjusted to generate an annual growth rate of 5.6% for real GDP at factor 
                                                                                                                                                 
had elasticities of zero, therefore the calibration only depends on service delivery as in the MP costing 
exercise. For model solutions post-calibration, the other determinants are again allowed to have an effect.
Name Targeted MDGs Financing
mdg2-fg MDG2 foreign grants
mdg2-tax MDG2 domestic taxes
mdg2-fb MDG2 foreign borrowing
mdg2-db MDG2 domestic borrowing
mdg45-fg MDGs 4 and 5 foreign grants
mdg45-tax MDGs 4 and 5 domestic taxes
mdg45-fb MDGs 4 and 5 foreign borrowing
mdg45-db MDGs 4 and 5 domestic borrowing
mdg7-fg      MDGs 7a and 7b foreign grants
mdg7-tax     MDGs 7a and 7b domestic taxes
mdg7-fb MDGs 7a and 7b foreign borrowing
mdg7-db MDGs 7a and 7b domestic borrowing
mdg-fg all MDGs foreign grants
mdg-tax all MDGs domestic taxes
mdg-fb all MDGs foreign borrowing
mdg-db all MDGs domestic borrowing
Table 6. Definition of MDG simulations
14
cost, the annual trend growth rate for the period 1970-2004.15 External factors will have a 
large impact on whether this growth rate can be realized. According to an analysis by the 
UNDP (2006), the external factors that may be particularly important are the overall rate 
of growth in the global economy, the evolution of oil prices, the role played by China in 
the world textile market (which has a strong bearing on the competitiveness of the FTZs), 
and the repercussions of the DR-CAFTA Free Trade Agreement.16 In the BASE scenario, 
government consumption grows at an exogenous rate of close to 5% per year, i.e., at a 
rate that is slightly lower than that of real GDP at factor cost. The only exception is 
education, for which we assume that government consumption is adjusted to assure that 
educational quality (measured by cycle-specific education services per student) will 
increase by 50% by 2015 for each cycle. These assumptions are compatible with studies 
that point to the need to raise educational quality in the DR (UN, 2004, p. 30).
Under the BASE scenario, FDI grows at a higher rate in 2005 and 2006 (drawing on 
recent data), with an overall growth rate for the period of about 5.6% in foreign currency 
– i.e., its share of GDP (measured in domestic currency) will only go up (down) if the 
exchange rate of the DR depreciates (appreciates). Similarly, transfers from the rest of the 
world to the government and to the private sector are set to grow exogenously at 3% in 
foreign currency. All remaining transfers between the government and households grow 
exogenously at the same rate as real GDP. Indirect tax rates are fixed over time. Foreign 
and domestic borrowing is assumed to increase exogenously over time with the overall 
economy (with foreign borrowing converting from a net negative to a net positive value). 
At the macro level, the model has three balances. For the government, direct taxes are 
adjusted endogenously to keep the government fiscal account balanced. Private 
investment is determined endogenously to maintain balance between total savings (from 
                                                
15 This estimate, which is courtesy of the UNDP office in the DR, is based on the Central Bank GDP series 
at constant 1970 prices. The years 1984, 1990, and 2003 were excluded since they were years of severe 
crisis and not considered representative of the trajectory of the DR economy.
16 To test the sensitivity of our results to the rate of growth in the BASE scenario, we re-run the different 
simulations with an alternative BASE in which GDP grows at 4% instead of 5.6%. See the Summary for 
some comparisons of the results.
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different sources) and total investment. The real exchange rate is flexible, assuring 
equality between total inflows and outflows of foreign exchange. The rule for keeping the 
government account in balance will change across the MDG simulations. As noted, the 
government will rely on four alternatives: foreign borrowing, domestic borrowing, direct 
taxes (the alternative used for BASE), and an endogenous component of transfers from 
the rest of the world to the government referred to as foreign grants. 
In the factor markets, stocks are driven by investment (for private capital) or a 
combination of demographic factors and the functioning of the educational system (for 
the different labor types). For factors, flexible rents clear the markets. For the different 
labor types, the model replicates observed unemployment rates in the BASE year. In 
other years, the unemployment rate and the wage will typically both change – declines in 
the unemployment rate will be combined with wage increases and vice versa – unless 
unemployment is at the minimum level (set at 5%), at which point wage movements will 
clear the labor market in question. The CPI is the model numéraire – nominal income and 
price changes should be interpreted in the context of a fixed CPI.
Table 7 summarizes the results for BASE. Figures 4-8 display business-as-usual time 
paths for several variables. Tables 8 and 9 provide results for sectoral growth and 
unemployment, respectively, for BASE as well as for all the remaining simulations. 
Appendix Tables A.3-A.6 provide more detailed information about the evolution of 
selected variables. As noted above, the annual growth rate is 5.6% for GDP at market 
price (and also at factor cost). For other macro aggregates, the annual growth rates are 
approximately 5-6%, relatively high for private demands and imports and relatively low 
for government demands and exports. Government consumption growth is influenced by 
the need for gradual improvements in educational quality. The real exchange rate 
appreciates moderately, by 0.3% per year (from an indexed value of 100 in 2005 to 96.4 
in 2015). 
At a more disaggregated level, GDP at factor cost grows at around 5-6% for most sectors, 
on average slightly more rapidly for the private sector than government sectors (Table 8). 
The main exception is government education where growth is rapid at the tertiary level 
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but slow at the primary level, primarily due to a gradual decline in out-of-cohort entrants 
to the first grade and relatively slow growth in the number of six-year olds (the cohort 
entering first grade). Among the private production sectors, growth is most rapid (around 
6% per year) for services, both social (health and education) and other. Growth in 
agriculture and industry is 4.8% and 4.6%, respectively. The industrial sector is 
disadvantaged by exchange rate appreciation.
Main Macroeconomic Aggregates*
2004 
Values
Units
Annual 
growth     
2004-2015 (%)
GDP at market prices 787 bn LCU 5.6
Total Absorption 780 bn LCU 6.3
Household consumption 574 bn LCU 6.4
Government consumption (total) 44 bn LCU 4.7
Gross capital formation (investment) 163 bn LCU 6.3
      - Private 135 bn LCU 6.5
      - Public 27 bn LCU 5.3
Exports 381 bn LCU 4.8
Imports 374 bn LCU 6.3
Real exchange rate (index) ** 100.0 index 96.4
Labour Market Outcomes Annual grw (%)
Employment 3,210     '000s 3.3
  Workers with < completed secondary education 1,773     '000s 2.8
  Workers with completed secondary education 990        '000s 3.4
  Workers with completed tertiary education 447        '000s 4.8
Real wage*** 74,356   LCU 2.1
  Workers with < completed secondary education 53,075   LCU 2.6
  Workers with completed secondary education 94,623   LCU 2.0
  Workers with completed tertiary education 113,888 LCU 0.8
MDG Outcomes Value in 2015
MDG 1: headcount poverty (official poverty line) 43.1 % 26.7
MDG 1: headcount poverty ($1PPP) 7.6 % 3.7
MDG 2: primary school completion**** 53.1 % 87.5
MDG 4: under-5 mortality (share of live births) 3.8 per 1,000 2.5
MDG 5: maternal mortality (share of live births) 17.8 per 100,000 9.2
MDG 7a: acess to safe drinking water 86.0 % 91.4
MDG 7b:acess to safe sanitation 90.0 % 91.5
Inequality Value in 2015
Labor income 0.486 Gini coeff 0.472
Per-capita household income 0.532 Gini coeff 0.491
Notes:
*The different macro aggregates are in real terms (at constant base-year LCU)
** Real exchange rate with respect to the CPI in a setting with constant CPI.
*** Wages are real in a setting with constant CPI.
**** Strict definition of completion rate: the share of the age cohort that enter first grade and successfully 
      pass (without repeating) through all eight years of primary school.
Table 7. Summary of Base Simulation Results
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Table 8. Growth in real GDP at factor cost by simulation and activity (%)
Activity base mdg2-fg mdg2-tax mdg2-fb mdg2-db mdg45-fg mdg45-tax mdg45-fb mdg45-db
Agriculture 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.0
Industry 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.3 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.5
Services - government
education - primary 0.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.9 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3
education - secondary 4.7 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.7 4.9 5.7 4.9 5.6
education - tertiary 8.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.3 9.9 10.7 9.9 10.6
health 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 20.9 21.5 20.9 21.4
water-sanitation 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
other infrastructure 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
other 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9
Services - private
education - primary 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.1
education - secondary 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.3 6.0 5.5
education - tertiary 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.2 5.6 6.2 5.6
health 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.1 5.8 5.7 5.2 5.7 5.3
other 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.3 5.9 6.2 5.8 6.2 5.0
Total 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.6 4.8
All government 4.6 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 9.2 9.6 9.2 9.6
All private 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.4 4.5
Simulation
Activity base mdg7-fg mdg7-tax mdg7-fb mdg7-db mdg-fg mdg-tax mdg-fb mdg-db
Agriculture 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.4 3.7
Industry 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.1
Services - government
education - primary 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.9 1.3 2.1
education - secondary 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.5 6.4 5.5 6.5
education - tertiary 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 11.6 12.5 11.6 12.7
health 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 20.8 21.5 20.8 21.7
water-sanitation 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.3
other infrastructure 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
other 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1
Services - private
education - primary 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.1 5.7 4.9
education - secondary 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.1 5.3 6.1 5.2
education - tertiary 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.3 5.5 6.3 5.4
health 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.7 5.2 5.7 5.0
other 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.1 5.7 6.1 4.5
Total 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.6 4.5
All government 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 9.3 9.8 9.3 9.9
All private 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.3 5.1 5.3 4.1
Simulation
Year or
simulation* Unskilled Semiskilled Skilled All
2004** 19.0 24.0 14.0 20.0
base 5.6 12.5 11.6 8.9
mdg2-fg 5.0 13.3 12.1 9.0
mdg2-tax 5.0 13.5 12.1 9.1
mdg2-fb 5.0 13.3 12.1 9.0
mdg2-db 5.6 14.2 12.5 9.7
mdg45-fg 5.0 9.0 7.9 6.8
mdg45-tax 5.1 9.3 7.7 6.9
mdg45-fb 5.0 9.0 7.9 6.8
mdg45-db 6.9 10.9 8.6 8.5
mdg7-fg 5.6 12.5 11.6 8.9
mdg7-tax 5.6 12.5 11.6 8.9
mdg7-fb 5.6 12.5 11.6 8.9
mdg7-db 5.6 12.5 11.6 8.9
mdg-fg 5.0 9.8 8.5 7.2
mdg-tax 5.0 10.2 8.2 7.3
mdg-fb 5.0 9.8 8.5 7.2
mdg-db 7.1 12.7 9.5 9.4
*The values for simulations are for 2015.
**2004 values: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana
Labor type
Table 9: Unemployment rate by labor type and 
simulation (%)
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For the three labor types, employment growth is in the range of 2.8-4.8% (Table 7) 
whereas labor force growth is slower at 1.4-2.6%. The growth rates are higher the higher 
the skill level. Employment growth exceeds labor force growth due to a decline in 
unemployment, which at the aggregate level decreases from 20% to 9% while the decline 
at a more disaggregated level is strongest for the lowest skilled (Table 9). 
Wage growth rates range between 0.8% and 2.6% with a reversal in order between the 
three labor types: those with the lowest employment growth enjoy the highest rates of 
wage growth. 
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Baseline simulation
In terms of the MDG targets, the baseline does not achieve any of the MDG targets 
except sanitation, which had been achieved prior to 2004.17 However, for all targets, 
significant improvements are realized between 2005 and 2015. Figures 6-8 show the 2015 
targets and the paths over time for MDG 2 
(primary completion rate), MDG 4 (the 
under-five mortality rate; the results for 
MDG 5 are similar), and MDG 7a (access to 
safe drinking water). According to the 
microsimulation results, the poverty rate 
based on the official poverty line decreases 
                                                
17 According to data estimated by the Panamerican Health Organization/World Health Organization-
UNICEF, access to better sanitation increased from 60% in 1990 to 90% in 2000 (UN, 2004). The 60% 
figure in 1990 implies a target of 80% for 2015.
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Figure 6: MDG 2: Net Primary Completion Rate.
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Figure 7: MDG 4: Under-5 Mortality Rate.
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Figure 8: MDG 7a:  Access to Safe Drinking Water.
Target year value and Baseline simulation
from 43.1% in 2005 to 26.7% in 2015, a strong decline although falling short of the 14% 
MDG target. Under the $1PPP poverty line, extreme poverty is cut by more than 50% 
compared to the 2004 rate, and almost reaches its MDG target of 1.3% (which is based on 
the 1997 $1PPP poverty rate of 2.6%).18 Thus, it seems to be the case that, as asserted by 
the government, if historical growth rates continue in the future, the poverty target is 
within reach. Inequality, measured by the Gini coefficients for labor and household per-
capita incomes, also declines-- for the latter from 0.53 in 2004 to 0.49 in 2015. The 
declines in the poverty rates - for different poverty lines - are primarily due to the decline 
in the unemployment rate, the decrease in wage gaps due to education differences, and 
increases in the average wage. The households in the poorest deciles of income 
distribution in the DR have the highest unemployment rates, therefore they stand to gain 
the most from decreases in these rates. For this reason, the extreme poor are benefiting
the most as can be seen by the larger decrease in extreme poverty versus moderate 
poverty. For inequality, the main reason behind its decline is the decrease in 
unemployment rates. However, the decrease in wage gaps by skill level also contributes 
(see Tables A.7-A.8).
4b. MDG Simulations
The rest of the simulations target the full achievement of one or more of the MDGs. The 
simulations are divided into four subsets: the first targets MDG 2 (universal primary 
                                                
18 Note that there is no information regarding the $1PPP poverty rate in 1990.
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education), the second MDGs 4 and 5 (reducing the under-five and maternal mortality 
rates, respectively), the third MDG 7a (improved access to water; the sanitation target, 
MDG 7b, has already been reached), and the fourth all of these together. Throughout, 
MDG 1, the poverty headcount, is not targeted but monitored. Each of the four simulation 
subsets are carried out with the four alternative sources of marginal government financing 
that were mentioned in the previous section (foreign grants, domestic taxes, foreign 
borrowing, and domestic borrowing). The different MDGs are targeted via endogenous 
variations in government demand (consumption) of the relevant services – primary 
education services for MDG 2, health for MDGs 4 and 5, and water-sanitation for MDG 
7a. The resulting growth in government service production will lead to government 
investment sufficient to maintain the same growth in government capital stocks (i.e., a 
Leontief relationship links government service production to government capital demand 
and stock growth). This is the key difference between these simulations and the BASE 
simulation, under which government demand growth was exogenous or set to generate a 
certain improvement in educational quality. This simulation design allows us to assess the 
effects and costs of achieving each MDG separately as well as of the strength of 
synergies in the form of lower resource needs and costs when the targets are all pursued 
together. For the MDG simulations, aggregate GDP growth may deviate from the rates 
under the BASE scenario due to different growth rates for TFP and factor stocks, as well 
as changes in labor unemployment rates.  
Targeting MDG 2 – Universal Primary Education
The simulation results are summarized in Table 10. Tables 8-9 and Figure 9 provide 
information on disaggregated sector growth, unemployment, and government spending. 
(See also Tables A.5-A.6 for information by subperiod on government spending,
employment, and wages.19) For the first subset of simulations, the GDP share for 
recurrent and capital spending on primary education expands rapidly during the first half 
                                                
19 Since the results are similar for both foreign financing scenarios, and since in terms of domestic 
financing the results are stronger under the domestic borrowing rather than tax simulations, the results by 
subperiods focus only on the foreign and domestic borrowing scenarios.
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BASE
Values Units mdg2-fg mdg2-tax mdg2-fb mdg2-db mdg45-fg mdg45-tax mdg45-fb mdg45-db
Main Macroeconomic Aggregates*
GDP at market prices 787 bn LCU 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.5 4.8
Total Absorption 780 bn LCU 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.0 6.7 6.2 6.7 5.6
Household consumption 574 bn LCU 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.2 6.5 5.9 6.5 5.9
Government consumption (total) 44 bn LCU 4.7 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 9.3 9.7 9.3 9.7
Gross capital formation (investment) 163 bn LCU 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.6 6.6 6.1 6.6 2.6
      - Private 135 bn LCU 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.5 5.8 6.5 5.8 6.5 1.3
      - Public 27 bn LCU 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 7.1 7.4 7.1 7.5
Exports 381 bn LCU 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.4 3.9 4.3 3.9 3.6
Imports 374 bn LCU 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.0 6.6 5.9 6.6 5.3
MDG and other Public Spending
Final consumption in education 1.22 % GDP 0.96 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.16 1.03 1.12 1.03 1.18
  - Primary 0.68 % GDP 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.46
  - Secondary 0.36 % GDP 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.39
  - Terciary 0.18 % GDP 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.33
Final consumption in health 0.87 % GDP 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.85 3.88 4.16 3.88 4.41
Final consumption in water & sanitation 0.0124 % GDP 0.0117 0.0117 0.0117 0.0117 0.0121 0.0117 0.0119 0.0117 0.0127
Final consumption in other public infrastructure 0.12 % GDP 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Final consumption in other govt services 3.31 % GDP 3.11 3.11 3.13 3.11 3.22 3.13 3.17 3.13 3.38
Investment in education 0.10 % GDP 0.03 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.032 0.046 0.032 0.051
  - Primary 0.05 % GDP 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.010
  - Secondary 0.03 % GDP 0.02 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.024 0.033 0.024 0.035
  - Terciary 0.01 % GDP 0.00 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
Investment in health 0.07 % GDP 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.89
Investment in water & sanitation 0.97 % GDP 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.97 1.05
Investment in other public infrastructure 0.65 % GDP 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.69
Investment in other government services 1.63 % GDP 1.60 1.49 1.50 1.49 1.55 1.64 1.70 1.64 1.81
Financing of MDG Strategy
Income tax revenue 2.6 % GDP 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 6.9 1.2 1.2
Government savings 4.1 % GDP 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.3 -2.2 2.9 -2.9 -4.0
Foreign savings -7.5 % GDP 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.8 8.8 3.7 9.6 3.9
Government domestic borrowing (flow) 1.0 % GDP 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 8.2
Government foreign borrowing (flow) -1.6 % GDP 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 5.8 0.3
Additional foreign grants to the govt (flow) 0.0 % GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government domestic debt (stock) 18.1 % GDP 18.0 18.0 18.1 18.0 27.2 17.8 18.2 17.8 40.2
Government external debt (stock) 34.1 % GDP 19.5 19.5 19.6 26.8 20.2 19.3 19.7 37.6 21.0
Real exchange rate (index) ** 100.0 index 96.4 96.4 96.4 96.4 96.3 93.6 96.2 93.6 96.1
Labour Market Outcomes
Employment 3,210  '000s 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3
  Workers with < completed secondary education 1,773  '000s 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6
  Workers with completed secondary education 990     '000s 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.5
  Workers with completed tertiary education 447     '000s 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.4
Real wage*** 74,356  LCU 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.5
  Workers with < completed secondary education 53,075  LCU 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.4
  Workers with completed secondary education 94,623  LCU 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.3
  Workers with completed tertiary education 113,888 LCU 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8
MDG Outcomes
MDG 1: headcount poverty (official poverty line) 43.1 % 26.7 25.9 26.0 25.8 26.9 24.2 24.7 23.7 26.1
MDG 1: headcount poverty ($1PPP) 3.3 % 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.5
MDG 2: primary school completion**** 53.1 % 87.5 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 89.0 88.9 89.0 88.9
MDG 4: under-5 mortality (share of live births) 3.8 per 1,000 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
MDG 5: maternal mortality (share of live births) 17.8 per 100,000 9.2 9.1 9.2 9.1 9.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
MDG 7a: acess to safe drinking water 86.0 % 91.4 91.4 91.3 91.4 91.3 91.4 91.2 91.4 91.2
MDG 7b:acess to safe sanitation 90.0 % 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.4 91.5 91.4 91.5 91.4
Inequality
Labor income 0.486 Gini coeff 0.472 0.469 0.470 0.471 0.470 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.481
Per-capita household income 0.532 Gini coeff 0.491 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.490 0.495 0.497 0.493 0.498
Notes:
*The different macro aggregates (absorption, consumption, investment, exports, imports, and GDP) are all in real terms (at constant base-year LCU)
** Real exchange rate with respect to the CPI in a setting with constant CPI.
*** Wages are real in a setting with constant CPI.
**** Strict definition of completion rate: the share of the age cohort that enter first grade and successfully pass (without repeating) through all eight years of primary school.
Value in 2015
Annual growth 2004-2015 (%)
Table 10. Summary of Simulation Results
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BASE
Values Units mdg7-fg mdg7-tax mdg7-fb mdg7-db mdg-fg mdg-tax mdg-fb mdg-db
Main Macroeconomic Aggregates*
GDP at market prices 787 bn LCU 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.5 4.4
Total Absorption 780 bn LCU 6.3 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.7 6.1 6.7 5.2
Household consumption 574 bn LCU 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.5 5.8 6.5 5.6
Government consumption (total) 44 bn LCU 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 9.4 9.8 9.4 10.0
Gross capital formation (investment) 163 bn LCU 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.0 6.6 1.6
      - Private 135 bn LCU 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.5 5.7 6.5 -0.1
      - Public 27 bn LCU 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 6.8 7.2 6.8 7.3
Exports 381 bn LCU 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.1
Imports 374 bn LCU 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.5 5.9 6.5 4.9
MDG and other Public Spending
Final consumption in education 1.22 % GDP 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.12 1.24 1.12 1.40
  - Primary 0.68 % GDP 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.43 0.53
  - Secundary 0.36 % GDP 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.45
  - Terciary 0.18 % GDP 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.42
Final consumption in health 0.87 % GDP 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 3.87 4.20 3.87 4.72
Final consumption in water & sanitation 0.0124 % GDP 0.0117 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Final consumption in other public infrastructure 0.12 % GDP 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Final consumption in other govt services 3.31 % GDP 3.11 3.11 3.11 3.11 3.11 3.13 3.19 3.13 3.52
Investment in education 0.10 % GDP 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.009 0.017 0.009 0.022
  - Primary 0.05 % GDP 0.00 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  - Secundary 0.03 % GDP 0.02 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.016
  - Terciary 0.01 % GDP 0.00 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.007
Investment in health 0.07 % GDP 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.95
Investment in water & sanitation 0.97 % GDP 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.03 0.96 1.16
Investment in other public infrastructure 0.65 % GDP 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.72
Investment in other government services 1.63 % GDP 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.53 1.59 1.53 1.77
Financing of MDG Strategy
Income tax revenue 2.6 % GDP 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 7.0 1.2 1.2
Government savings 4.1 % GDP 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 -2.3 2.8 -3.2 -5.1
Foreign savings -7.5 % GDP 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 8.8 3.7 9.8 4.1
Government domestic borrowing (flow) 1.0 % GDP 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 9.4
Government foreign borrowing (flow) -1.6 % GDP 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 6.0 0.3
Additional foreign grants to the govt (flow) 0.0 % GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government domestic debt (stock) 18.1 % GDP 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.3 17.8 18.3 17.8 51.9
Government external debt (stock) 34.1 % GDP 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.8 19.5 19.4 19.8 44.7 21.9
Real exchange rate (index) ** 100.0 index 96.4 96.4 96.4 96.4 96.4 93.6 96.2 93.6 96.0
Labour Market Outcomes
Employment 3,210  '000s 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.2
  Workers with < completed secondary education 1,773  '000s 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3
  Workers with completed secondary education 990     '000s 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.5
  Workers with completed tertiary education 447     '000s 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.6
Real wage*** 74,356  LCU 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.4
  Workers with < completed secondary education 53,075  LCU 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.3
  Workers with completed secondary education 94,623  LCU 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.0
  Workers with completed tertiary education 113,888 LCU 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.5
MDG Outcomes
MDG 1: headcount poverty (official poverty line) 43.1 % 26.7 26.5 26.6 26.6 26.8 23.6 24.0 23.6 26.5
MDG 1: headcount poverty ($1PPP) 3.3 % 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6
MDG 2: primary school completion**** 53.1 % 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0
MDG 4: under-5 mortality (share of live births) 3.8 per 1,000 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
MDG 5: maternal mortality (share of live births) 17.8 per 100,000 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
MDG 7a: acess to safe drinking water 86.0 % 91.4 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5
MDG 7b:acess to safe sanitation 90.0 % 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.5
Inequality
Labor income 0.486 Gini coeff 0.472 0.473 0.472 0.473 0.474 0.476 0.480 0.477 0.482
Per-capita household income 0.532 Gini coeff 0.491 0.491 0.492 0.491 0.492 0.492 0.493 0.492 0.501
Notes:
*The different macro aggregates (absorption, consumption, investment, exports, imports, and GDP) are all in real terms (at constant base-year LCU)
** Real exchange rate with respect to the CPI in a setting with constant CPI.
*** Wages are real in a setting with constant CPI.
**** Strict definition of completion rate: the share of the age cohort that enter first grade and successfully pass (without repeating) through all eight years of primary school.
Annual growth 2004-2015 (%)
MDG7 All MDGs
Value in 2015
Value in 2015
Value in 2015
Annual growth 2004-2015 (%)
Value in 2015
Table 10 -- cont. Summary of Simulation Results
2004 BASE & SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE PERIOD 2004-2015
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of the simulation period. This reflects that in order to achieve the target of a 100% 
primary completion rate by 2015 all students of the correct age cohort must enter first 
grade by 2008 and successfully 
pass through the eight years of the 
primary cycle.20 Due to more rapid 
growth in the number of primary 
school graduates and the policy of 
improving quality (service level 
per student) in secondary and 
tertiary education, government 
spending on these two cycles must 
also expand. 
More specifically, for the period 2005-2010, government expenditure on primary 
education under the MDG2-db scenario is 50% larger than in the base year (1.1% versus 
0.7% of GDP in 2004; see Table A.5). The required government investment increases 
from 0.06% of GDP in 2004 to 0.17% of GDP on average for the period 2005-2010. As a 
share of GDP, spending is lower during the final five-year period, 2010-15, in part due to 
a declining inflow of out-of-cohort students into first grade (as primary schools become 
increasingly successful in getting students to enter in the right year) and relatively lower 
projections for population growth rates of primary school age children. For secondary and 
tertiary education, the spending expansion takes place during the final period, when the 
number of students that have graduated from primary has started to increase significantly. 
Because of this decline toward the end for primary education, there is little difference 
between the MDG 2 scenarios and BASE or across different MDG 2 scenarios when the 
comparison is based only on the level of flow variables in 2015.
                                                
20 The MDG 2 value that we consider in this model is a very strict definition of the primary school 
completion rate: all students of the correct age cohort must not only enter first grade and successfully pass 
through all eight years, but they must do so on time (i.e., without repeating). This is the reason why an 
entry rate into first grade of 94% and a passing rate at 93-94% as an average for each of the 8 years of the 
cycle generate an MDG 2 starting value of 54% in the model.  
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Figure 9: Government Expenditure on Primary 
Education (bn DR Pesos)
Baseline and MDG Simulations
Note: "mdg2" targets only educ; "mdg" targets all MDGs; fb = foreign borrowing; db = domestic borrowing
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The main difference between the different MDG 2 simulations is that growth in GDP is 
slower when additional financing comes from domestic borrowing (5.3% annual GDP 
growth for MDG2-db vs. 5.6% for BASE), reflecting that less financing is available for 
private investment (for which growth declines strongly), with a negative impact on 
growth in the private capital stock. Even if a lot of investment comes from foreign 
companies (given the importance of FTZs in the DR), on the margin, financing for 
private investment is still affected by government borrowing. Private consumption 
growth also declines. Government demand is protected since it is driven by policy. On 
the production side, GDP growth accelerates for government education services at the 
expense of private sectors across the board. 
Except for the domestic borrowing scenario, the results for the other MDG 2 simulations 
are all quite similar to each other. Given that higher growth in household consumption 
has a positive impact on education outcomes (see Table 5 for determinants of MDG 2 
outcomes), growth in government spending on primary education is slightly lower than 
for the domestic borrowing scenario (MDG2-db). Growth in exports and imports is 
similar to BASE, i.e. the decline observed for MDG2-db is not repeated since growth in 
GDP and domestic demand does not slow down for these scenarios. The changes in the 
real exchange rate are similar to BASE for all four simulations. The negative impact on 
private sector production is much smaller given that GDP growth does not decline. 
The above comments apply to the full period. For the period 2005-2010, the scenarios 
with foreign financing (MDG2-fg and MDG2-fb) generate stronger real exchange rate 
appreciation and import growth whereas export growth slows down (see Table A.4). The 
cumulative burden of reaching MDG 2 is indicated by the increase in the 2015 foreign 
and domestic debt stock relative to GDP by 7-9 percentage points for MDG2-fb and 
MDG2-db, respectively (larger for MDG2-db because of slower GDP growth).
Compared to BASE, all four MDG2 simulations lead to lower employment growth for 
unskilled workers but higher growth for semi-skilled and skilled workers. This reflects 
that, rather than entering the labor force, more and more students remain in school, 
decreasing the supply of unskilled workers. On the other hand, as more students graduate 
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from secondary and tertiary, the supplies of semi-skilled and skilled workers increase. At 
the same time, demand for semi-skilled and skilled workers increases as the education 
sector expands. For wages, the situation is reversed: when stock growth increases, wage 
growth slows down and vice versa. In response to wage changes, moderate changes in 
unemployment (declining for the unskilled and increasing for the semi-skilled and 
skilled) mitigate the repercussions of these stock changes. For the simulation that relies 
on domestic borrowing, the stronger negative effect on the overall growth rate of the 
economy translates into a growth rate for unskilled wages that is similar to BASE. For the 
MDG 2 simulations, poverty rates and inequality decline slightly more strongly than for 
BASE, mainly as a result of a relative increase in unskilled wages combined (in all 
MDG2 scenarios except MDG2-db) with a higher average wage (see Tables A.6-A.8).
Targeting MDGs 4 and 5 – Reduced Under-Five and Maternal Mortality Rates
The next subset of simulations focuses on achieving the health MDGs under each of the 
four financing mechanisms (MDG45-fg, MDG45-tax, MDG45-fb, and MDG45-db). 
Compared to BASE, the required annual 
growth rate of government demand for 
health services increases drastically (see 
Figure 10). The spending increase 
needed to achieve the health targets is 
much larger than the one needed for 
education (or water and sanitation). 
Government recurrent spending on 
health reaches 3.9-4.4% of GDP in 2015 as compared to 0.9% of GDP in 2004. 
Government investment in health also increases quite strongly, from 0.1% of GDP in 
2004 to 0.8-0.9% in 2015, reflecting that the expansion of production in the sector also 
requires an expanded capital stock. 
Therefore, total health spending (the sum of recurrent and investment spending) jumps 
strongly relative to 2004, reaching 5.3% of GDP at its peak. Relative to other countries in 
the LAC region this GDP share is high but not out of the existing range – in 2003, the 
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GDP spending shares on health in Colombia and Costa Rica were higher, at 6.4% and 
5.8%, respectively (Table 11). On the other hand, given budgetary constraints, it may be 
difficult to implement such a strong spending 
increase during this short time period. 
Efficiency in the health sector would perhaps 
also suffer, for example if there exist 
constraints in terms of labor with specialized 
skills or experience, or if there is a need for 
institutional or organizational changes.
The impact on the rest of the economy from reaching the health MDGs depends strongly 
on the financing mechanism. If marginal financing comes from domestic sources (taxes 
or domestic borrowing), growth in private consumption and private investment declines
strongly. The decline is especially strong for the domestic borrowing scenario (MDG45-
db) since the government demand increase is combined with a decline in GDP growth to 
4.8% from 5.6% per year for BASE. For the case of tax financing, the decline in GDP 
growth is more moderate (to 5.4% per year). GDP growth declines because of lower 
growth in private savings and private investment, driven by a combination of lower 
private income growth (for both scenarios), higher taxes (only for MDG45-tax), and 
higher government borrowing that reduces funding available for private investment (only 
for MDG45-db). Given unchanged foreign aid, lower GDP growth reduces the level of 
total domestic final demand (or absorption). As in the case of the MDG2 simulations, 
other things being equal, government services and related spending (here health-related) 
must grow more rapidly when growth in private consumption slows down. Due to lower 
growth in GDP and domestic demand, both exports and imports grow more slowly than 
for BASE (losing 0.4-1.2% in annual growth) without much impact on the real exchange 
rate.
Country 2003 Country 2003
Colombia 6.39 Bahamas, The 3.04
Cuba 6.34 Chile 2.98
Costa Rica 5.75 Mexico 2.88
Panama 5.05 Haiti 2.86
Grenada 4.93 Jamaica 2.68
Barbados 4.79 Uruguay 2.67
Dominica 4.49 Dominican Rep 2.32
Argentina 4.33 Paraguay 2.3
Bolivia 4.29 Guatemala 2.14
Honduras 4.01 Peru 2.13
El Salvador 3.73 Venezuela, RB 1.99
Nicaragua 3.73 Ecuador 1.97
Brazil 3.44 Trinidad&Tobago 1.47
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
(% GDP, 2003)
Table 11: Health Expenditures, Public
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On the other hand, when marginal financing comes from foreign sources (in the form of 
grants or borrowing), the negative impact from increased domestic resource mobilization
on private investment is absent. At the macro level, GDP growth declines slightly due to 
a reallocation of resources to government service sectors that have lower TFP growth
(although GDP measured at factor cost is practically the same). The inflow of foreign 
resources gives rise to a larger trade deficit with slower export growth (3.9% per year 
versus 4.8% for BASE) and faster import growth (6.6% versus 6.3% for BASE), both 
induced by more rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Due to very rapid growth in the production of government health services (by around 
21% per year), the annual growth rate for total government service production is 
approximately doubled, from 4.6% under BASE to 9.2-9.6%, with the higher increases 
applying to scenarios with domestic financing, which squeezes growth in household 
consumption (see Table 8). More government production reduces the resources available 
for the private sector, so that GDP growth for private activities declines 0.3-0.5% when 
overall GDP growth is roughly unchanged and by as much as 1.2% when overall GDP 
growth declines due to a squeeze on private investment. 
Compared to BASE, more rapid growth in the relatively skill-intensive health sector 
results in higher wage and employment growth for skilled workers across all four health 
simulations. The employment increase is primarily due to a decline in unemployment 
(more people are enticed to work because of higher wages) as opposed to more rapid 
growth in the labor force. Semi-skilled employment also grows by more than for BASE, 
while unskilled employment growth is about the same or decreases very slightly. Wage 
growth for all labor types is also more rapid than for BASE. The only exception occurs 
when domestic borrowing is the financing mechanism: the strong negative effect on GDP 
leads to a decline in the growth rate for unskilled wages, which falls below the rate for 
the BASE simulation (or any of the previous simulations).
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The health MDG targets are by construction reached under these four simulations. As 
explained earlier, drawing on the econometric literature21 we incorporate a positive link 
between better health outcomes and better education outcomes (see the determinants in 
Table 5). Accordingly, the more positive outcome for health indicators results in a more 
positive outcome for MDG 2 than under BASE. Poverty falls lower than for BASE, 
especially for the simulations based on foreign financing. For these, the headcount rate 
based on the official poverty line declines to around 24% as opposed to 26.7% for BASE, 
mainly as a result of the decrease in unemployment combined with the increase in the 
average wage (see Tables 9 and A.6-A.7).  Inequality in terms of both labor and per-
capita household income, as measured by the Gini coefficients, decreases by less over 
time than for BASE.
Targeting MDG 7a – Increased Access to Water
The next four simulations instead focus on achieving the water MDG target. The policy 
changes and effects of achieving this target are very small given the relatively small size 
of the sector and the fact that the BASE simulation is close to achieving the target. 
Therefore, both recurrent government expenditure and investment are practically the 
same as in BASE, as is aggregate recurrent government spending given the small share of 
recurrent spending in total water and sanitation expenditure. The other results – including 
macro aggregates, employment and wages – are also all very similar to BASE. 
Targeting all MDGs Simultaneously
Under the final four simulations (MDG-fg, MDG-tax, MDG-fb, and MDG-db), all of the 
MDGs (MDGs 2, 4, 5, and 7a) are targeted at the same time. Figures 11-14 show the 
evolution of selected indicators.
                                                
21 See the literature review in the MAMS chapter and the DR results in Cicowiez and Tornarolli (2006).
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At the macro level, the combined impact of government expansion in different areas 
results in government consumption and investment growth of 6.8-10% annually as 
opposed to 4.7-5.3% for BASE. The size of the financing that is needed is indicated by 
the fact that, for the scenario with financing from domestic borrowing (MDG-db), the 
government debt in 2015 has increased by 34% of GDP compared to the BASE scenario, 
reaching close to 52% in 2015. Under the domestic financing scenarios, GDP growth 
suffers, falling from 5.6% for BASE to 5.4% for MDG-tax and 4.4% for MDG-db. Like 
before, this is due to some combination of (i) lower private capital accumulation (caused 
by lower private post-tax incomes and savings and, for MDG-db, the fact that the 
government diverts a larger part of savings to its own investments); and (ii) reallocation 
of resources to sectors (government services) with lower TFP growth. Given this slow-
down in GDP growth, unchanged access to foreign resources, and higher tax rates or 
increased domestic borrowing, growth slows down also for private consumption (from 
6.4% per year for BASE to 5.5 and 5.8% per year for MDG-db and MDG-tax, 
respectively), and investment (from 6.5% for BASE to 5.7% for MDG-tax and –0.1% for 
MDG-db). 
For the scenarios with foreign financing, the macro outcomes are quite different. The 
inflow of foreign resources makes it possible to expand government consumption and 
investment without additional taxes and domestic borrowing. GDP growth is very close 
to the BASE rate (especially for GDP at factor cost). Due to positive spillover effects 
from the inflow of foreign resources (reducing the costs of imports and permitting the 
labor force to become better educated and more productive), private consumption and 
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investment grow slightly more rapidly than under BASE. As a share of GDP, the debt in 
this case expands by less (some 25% of GDP in 2015) -- a result of more rapid GDP 
growth and, to a lesser extent, exchange rate appreciation.
Relative to the domestic financing scenarios, more rapid private consumption growth 
reduces the required growth in both government consumption and investment by 0.4-0.6 
percentage points. If measured relative to GDP, the decline in government expenditure is 
even stronger given more rapid GDP growth (especially compared to the domestic 
borrowing scenario). Across all simulations with full MDG achievement, the need for 
MDG service expansion is mitigated by synergies: improvements in water and sanitation 
(although these are very small) reduce the need for service expansion in health while 
improvements in health reduce the need for service expansion in primary education.
At a more disaggregated level, government expenditures follow patterns that are similar 
to what we observed for the simulations that targeted each MDG individually: spending 
in education is front-loaded due to the 2008 target, spending in health grows steadily over 
time (becoming higher in the second half of the simulation), and investment is more 
important than recurrent spending for the water and sanitation sector (see Figures 10-12).
Growth in the private sector declines for all full MDG scenarios (see Table 8), especially 
for the domestic borrowing scenario since this scenario combines a decline in total GDP 
growth and an increase in government production (since private demand for and 
production of health and education services suffers). 
In the labor market, wages grow more rapidly compared to the BASE for all full MDG 
scenarios except the scenario where extra financing comes from increased domestic 
borrowing (in which case overall wages increase by more than BASE only for skilled
labor). The latter scenario also registers less of a decrease in overall unemployment by 
2015 as compared to BASE (only skilled labor has comparatively lower unemployment 
rates in 2015; see Table 9). For all full MDG scenarios, wage gaps between different skill 
levels decline due to the expansion in primary education, which reduces the supply of 
unskilled labor. The same effects occur in the subset of equations where MDG 2 is 
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targeted on its own: more students stay in school instead of entering the unskilled labor 
force. In addition, the MDG-related public sectors that expand rapidly when all the 
MDGs are targeted require even less unskilled and more semi-skilled and skilled labor 
(see Figure 13). 
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By assumption, all non-poverty MDGs reach their targets. For poverty (MDG 1), the 
simulations with foreign financing cut the 2004 rates by close to half, returning to pre-
2003-crisis poverty levels. Poverty declines relative to BASE for all scenarios. Compared 
to non-BASE scenarios, the reduction is stronger (although by a small margin compared 
to the MDG health scenarios), once again with the exception of the domestic borrowing 
scenario. However, it still falls short of the target of cutting the headcount poverty rate by 
half. On the other hand, the headcount extreme poverty rate using the $1PPP value does 
reach the 2015 target for all but the domestic borrowing scenario. Inequality is roughly 
unchanged compared to BASE. 
4. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has addressed two main questions: Will the DR achieve its MDGs under 
current policies and investment levels? If not, what changes in development strategy are 
needed to achieve the MDGs and what is the cost? With regard to the first question, the 
results for our business-as-usual scenario indicate that, in spite of considerable progress 
across the board, the answer is negative. The only exception is the sanitation target, 
which was already achieved by 2004. However, with regard to MDG 1 it should be noted 
that the assumed target is set relative to the rate in 1998. Because of the high GDP and 
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household consumption growth throughout the 1990s, the poverty rate was most likely 
higher in 1990. Given this, it is not impossible that the simulated rate achieved in 2015 is 
actually less than half the 1990 rate, or close to this target. 
The simulations designed to answer the second question indicate that it would be very 
difficult to achieve all MDGs, especially in health and, to a lesser extent, in primary 
education. For health, real government services would need to increase very rapidly up to 
2015 (by around 20% per year). For primary education, the difficulty lies less in the 
required service increase but more in the strong frontloading that would be needed to 
assure that by 2008 (very close to) all students of the correct age cohort enter first grade 
and successfully make it through primary school without repeating or dropping out. If 
this objective is not attained, then it is not possible for everyone to complete a full, eight-
year primary cycle on a timely basis by 2015. On the other hand, compared to other 
countries’ governments in Latin America, the DR government allocates a very small 
share of GDP to social sectors. From this angle, expanded spending seems reasonable.
However, the effects of a large expansion in government services very much depend on 
the financing mechanism. Our results indicate that if marginal financing needs are met by 
grant aid or foreign borrowing (at base-year interest rates) then there is no trade-off 
between, on the one hand, poverty reduction and growth promotion and, on the other 
hand, the achievement of non-poverty MDGs. However, the DR is not a likely candidate 
for sufficient amounts of grant aid and is unlikely to further raise its foreign debt and 
debt-servicing burden. Moreover, unless managed wisely, increased inflows of foreign 
exchange can generate undesirable byproducts in the form of Dutch Disease effects that 
change the production structure away from tradables; such a change may be 
unsustainable if the inflows of foreign exchange then decline. Reduced openness to trade 
with the rest of the world (perhaps most importantly due to less exports) may also have a 
long-run negative impact on productivity growth. 
Another clear finding of our analysis is that, if marginal financing is raised from domestic 
sources, then it is important to make sure that the government does not crowd out private 
investment to such an extent that growth suffers. In practice, a feasible strategy would 
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have to explore tax schemes that minimize negative effects on incentives to save and 
invest, as was assumed in the subset of our simulations where effective direct tax rates 
were raised. At any rate, consideration of financing issues adds to the difficulty of 
achieving the MDGs in a timely manner. 
Finally, although growth analysis is not our focus, it is important to be aware that rapid 
growth is crucial for the achievement of the MDGs in the DR and elsewhere. In order to 
test the sensitivity of our results to the rate of growth in the BASE scenario, we re-ran the 
different simulations with an alternative BASE in which GDP grew at 4% instead of 
5.6%. Under such scenarios, it is much more difficult to achieve both poverty and non-
poverty MDGs since slower growth in household incomes leads to higher poverty rates. 
For this alternative BASE scenario, the 2015 headcount rate under the official poverty 
line was 33.3%, considerably above the 26.7% figure under the BASE scenario with 
more rapid GDP growth. Moreover, in a situation with slower growth in private 
consumption of health and education services, more rapid growth in government services 
is required. Relative to levels of GDP that in this setting are lower, such service 
expansion seems infeasible. 
In light of this, the best way forward for the DR government may be to opt for a 
combination of gradual expansion of targeted social (health and education) services
(although this may imply that it takes longer to achieve the education target), as well as 
measures to raise government efficiency and reallocate spending to high-priority areas, if 
needed financed with domestic taxes. It is also crucial to identify and expand growth-
promoting programs and policies, especially if they can be designed to assume that the 
poor capture most of the payoffs. 
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Appendix
Table A.1. Macro SAM for the Dominican Republic, 2004 (bn of Pesos)
act com fac hhd gov row tax-dir tax-imp tax-exp tax-oind int-dom int-row sav-inv total
act 726.4 726.4
com 572.9 43.0 390.4 162.3 1168.7
fac 695.8 13.3 709.1
hhd 645.7 39.1 107.0 2.9 794.7
gov 3.2 7.1 26.6 35.3 1.9 53.5 127.6
row 382.2 57.2 7.2 0.1 12.2 458.9
tax-dir 6.2 20.4 26.6
tax-imp 35.3 35.3
tax-exp 1.9 1.9
tax-oind 30.6 22.9 53.5
int-dom 2.9 2.9
int-row 1.4 10.8 12.2
sav-inv 189.5 31.7 -58.9 162.3
total 726.4 1168.7 709.1 794.7 127.6 458.9 26.6 35.3 1.9 53.5 2.9 12.2 162.3
Full account names: Activities, Commodities, Factors, Households, Government, Rest of World, Direct Taxes, Import 
Taxes, Export Taxes, Other Indirect Taxes, Domestic Interest Payments, Interest Payments due to the Rest of the 
World, Savings-Investment, and Total.
Table A.2. Model Elasticities
Activity/Commodity Armington CET CES CES-2 LES
Agriculture 1.1 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.0
Industry 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.0
Private Services 0.7 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.0
Public Services 1.3 0.8
Note: (*) Armington = elasticity of substitution between imports & domestic output in domestic demand. 
CET = elasticity of transformation for domestic marketed output between exports and domestic supplies. 
CES = elasticity of substitution between factors - bottom of technology nest.                                       
CES-2 = elasticity of substitution between aggregate factors and intermediates - top of technology nest. 
LES = expenditure elasticity of market demand by commodity. 
Source: Estimates for Armington and CET taken from values in Aristy-Escuder, 1999.
Elasticity*
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Table A.3. Real GDP by simulation
2004
(bn LCU) 2004-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2004-2015
Base 787 5.18 5.76 5.52 5.59
mdg2-fg 787 5.16 5.73 5.55 5.59
mdg2-tax 787 5.18 5.63 5.53 5.54
mdg2-fb 787 5.16 5.73 5.55 5.59
mdg2-db 787 5.17 5.21 5.32 5.26
mdg45-fg 787 5.19 5.72 5.43 5.54
mdg45-tax 787 5.19 5.67 5.2 5.41
mdg45-fb 787 5.19 5.72 5.43 5.54
mdg45-db 787 5.19 5.44 4.08 4.8
mdg7-fg 787 5.19 5.76 5.52 5.59
mdg7-tax 787 5.18 5.75 5.51 5.59
mdg7-fb 787 5.19 5.76 5.52 5.59
mdg7-db 787 5.18 5.75 5.5 5.58
mdg-fg 787 5.17 5.69 5.45 5.54
mdg-tax 787 5.18 5.54 5.2 5.35
mdg-fb 787 5.17 5.69 5.45 5.54
mdg-db 787 5.18 4.91 3.75 4.41
LCU: Dominican Republic Pesos
Average growth rate
Table A.4. Exchange Rate (indices for 2004 and 2015; averages for subperiods)
2004 2004-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2004-2015 2015
Base 100.0 97.2 94.9 95.8 95.8 96.2
mdg2-fg 100.0 97.0 93.9 95.5 95.2 96.1
mdg2-tax 100.0 97.2 94.8 95.8 95.7 96.2
mdg2-fb 100.0 97.0 93.9 95.5 95.2 96.1
mdg2-db 100.0 97.2 94.8 95.7 95.6 96.1
mdg45-fg 100.0 97.3 94.3 93.0 94.1 91.3
mdg45-tax 100.0 97.2 94.9 95.6 95.6 95.8
mdg45-fb 100.0 97.3 94.3 93.0 94.1 91.3
mdg45-db 100.0 97.2 94.9 95.6 95.6 95.7
mdg7-fg 100.0 97.2 94.8 95.6 95.6 96.0
mdg7-tax 100.0 97.2 94.9 95.8 95.8 96.2
mdg7-fb 100.0 97.2 94.8 95.6 95.6 96.0
mdg7-db 100.0 97.2 94.9 95.8 95.8 96.2
mdg-fg 100.0 97.0 93.2 92.5 93.4 91.1
mdg-tax 100.0 97.2 94.8 95.6 95.6 95.7
mdg-fb 100.0 97.0 93.2 92.5 93.4 91.1
mdg-db 100.0 97.2 94.8 95.3 95.5 95.5
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Table A.5.  Government Real Recurrent and Capital Expenditure by Sector and 
Simulation.
2004
(bn LCU) 2004 2004-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2004-2015 2015
Base Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.128 1.02 0.98 1.01 0.96
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.653 0.62 0.48 0.54 0.40
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.317 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.33
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.158 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.23
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.872 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.82
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.24 3.14 3.19 3.11
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.047 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.027 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.070 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 0.996 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.96
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.495 1.63 1.62 1.62 1.60
mdg2-fb Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.216 1.59 1.30 1.39 1.08
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.741 1.11 0.68 0.84 0.44
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.317 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.36
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.158 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.28
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.872 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.82
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.25 3.16 3.21 3.13
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.138 0.23 0.03 0.12 0.01
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.118 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.00
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.00
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.070 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 0.996 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.97
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.64
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.679 1.91 1.46 1.67 1.50
mdg2-db Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.222 1.62 1.38 1.45 1.16
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.745 1.14 0.72 0.87 0.47
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.318 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.38
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.159 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.30
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.872 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.24 3.15 3.20 3.11
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.143 0.22 0.03 0.12 0.01
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.122 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.00
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.00
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.070 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 0.996 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.96
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.64
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.694 1.89 1.46 1.67 1.49
mdg45-fb Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.128 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.03
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.653 0.62 0.48 0.55 0.41
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.317 0.28 0.34 0.32 0.34
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.158 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.28
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.858 1.43 2.99 2.25 3.88
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.24 3.16 3.20 3.13
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.047 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.027 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.054 0.34 0.62 0.48 0.75
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 0.996 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.97
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.64
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.495 1.64 1.65 1.64 1.64
mdg45-db Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.128 1.04 1.11 1.09 1.18
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.652 0.63 0.52 0.57 0.46
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.317 0.29 0.37 0.33 0.39
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.158 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.33
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.857 1.45 3.23 2.37 4.41
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.26 3.29 3.28 3.38
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.047 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.027 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.053 0.34 0.70 0.51 0.89
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 0.996 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.05
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.69
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.494 1.65 1.75 1.70 1.81
% of GDP
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Table A.5 -- cont.  Government Real Recurrent and Capital Expenditure by Sector and 
Simulation
2004
(bn LCU) 2004 2004-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2004-2015 2015
mdg7-fb Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.128 1.02 0.98 1.01 0.96
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.653 0.62 0.48 0.54 0.40
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.317 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.33
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.158 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.23
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.872 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.82
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.24 3.15 3.19 3.11
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.047 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.027 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.070 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 1.056 1.03 1.00 1.01 0.95
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.495 1.63 1.62 1.62 1.60
mdg7-db Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.129 1.02 0.98 1.01 0.96
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.653 0.62 0.48 0.55 0.40
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.318 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.33
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.158 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.23
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.872 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.82
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.24 3.15 3.19 3.11
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.047 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.027 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.070 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 1.057 1.03 1.00 1.01 0.95
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.496 1.63 1.62 1.62 1.60
mdg-fb Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.217 1.551 1.312 1.388 1.123
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.742 1.074 0.659 0.814 0.429
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.317 0.349 0.403 0.375 0.362
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.158 0.129 0.250 0.200 0.332
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.858 1.439 2.985 2.251 3.869
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.114 0.111 0.113 0.110
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.245 3.158 3.202 3.130
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.139 0.211 0.032 0.112 0.009
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.119 0.150 0.000 0.070 0.000
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.059 0.027 0.038 0.004
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.054 0.338 0.621 0.474 0.752
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 1.055 1.028 1.004 1.009 0.956
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.666 0.648 0.655 0.642
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.683 1.885 1.487 1.677 1.528
mdg-db Education expenditure 9.6 1.22 1.224 1.598 1.510 1.515 1.399
  - Primary 5.3 0.68 0.746 1.106 0.754 0.881 0.531
  - Secondary 2.9 0.36 0.319 0.359 0.465 0.411 0.453
  - Tertiary 1.4 0.18 0.159 0.134 0.291 0.222 0.416
Health expenditure 6.9 0.87 0.869 1.491 3.430 2.485 4.715
Water and Sanitation expenditure 0.1 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014
Other public infrastructure expenditure 0.9 0.12 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.118 0.124
Other government services expenditure 26.0 3.31 3.307 3.294 3.407 3.357 3.523
Fixed investment in education 0.8 0.10 0.144 0.223 0.044 0.126 0.022
  - Primary 0.4 0.05 0.124 0.158 0.000 0.076 0.000
  - Secondary 0.3 0.03 0.017 0.064 0.039 0.047 0.016
  - Tertiary 0.1 0.01 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.007
Fixed investment in health 0.6 0.07 0.066 0.362 0.740 0.542 0.953
Fixed investment in water and 7.6 0.97 1.062 1.052 1.137 1.090 1.162
Fixed investment in other public 5.1 0.65 0.662 0.676 0.699 0.687 0.723
Fixed investment in other government 12.8 1.63 1.697 1.936 1.645 1.788 1.772
LCU: 
* The percent of GDP in each subperiod corresponds to an average.
% of GDP
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Table A.6. Employment and Wages by Labor Type and by Simulation.
2004 2015 2004-05 2005-10 2010-15 2004-15 2004 2015 2004-05 2005-10 2010-15 2004-15
base
Unskilled 1,773 2,409 3.5 3.2 2.3 2.8 53.1 70.1 1.8 2.4 2.9 2.6
Semi-Skilled 990 1,429 4.0 3.5 3.2 3.4 94.6 117.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0
Skilled 447 750 4.5 4.5 5.2 4.8 113.9 124.4 -0.1 1.1 0.7 0.8
Total 3,210 4,588 3.8 3.5 3.0 3.3 74.4 93.7 1.6 2.1 2.3 2.1
mdg2-fb
Unskilled 1,773 2,336 3.5 3.0 1.9 2.5 53.1 71.9 1.8 2.6 3.2 2.8
Semi-Skilled 990 1,460 4.4 3.9 3.1 3.6 94.6 115.6 2.8 2.2 1.3 1.8
Skilled 447 771 4.5 4.7 5.6 5.1 113.9 122.4 -0.1 1.4 0.1 0.7
Total 3,210 4,567 3.9 3.5 2.9 3.3 74.4 94.4 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.2
mdg2-db
Unskilled 1,773 2,323 3.5 2.8 2.0 2.5 53.1 70.2 1.8 2.3 3.0 2.6
Semi-Skilled 990 1,445 4.4 3.8 3.0 3.5 94.6 113.8 2.7 2.0 1.2 1.7
Skilled 447 764 4.5 4.6 5.5 5.0 113.9 120.5 -0.1 1.1 0.0 0.5
Total 3,210 4,533 3.9 3.4 2.9 3.2 74.4 92.6 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.0
mdg45-fb
Unskilled 1,773 2,404 3.5 3.2 2.3 2.8 53.1 71.9 1.8 2.5 3.3 2.8
Semi-Skilled 990 1,472 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.7 94.6 125.2 2.1 2.4 2.8 2.6
Skilled 447 807 4.4 5.0 6.2 5.5 113.9 142.8 -0.3 2.3 2.3 2.1
Total 3,210 4,683 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.5 74.4 100.9 1.5 2.6 3.3 2.8
mdg45-db
Unskilled 1,773 2,355 3.5 3.1 1.9 2.6 53.1 68.7 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.4
Semi-Skilled 990 1,442 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.5 94.6 121.0 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3
Skilled 447 800 4.4 5.0 6.1 5.4 113.9 139.1 -0.3 2.2 1.9 1.8
Total 3,210 4,597 3.7 3.6 3.0 3.3 74.4 97.4 1.5 2.5 2.7 2.5
mdg7-fb
Unskilled 1,773 2,409 3.5 3.2 2.3 2.8 53.1 70.1 1.8 2.4 2.9 2.6
Semi-Skilled 990 1,429 4.0 3.5 3.2 3.4 94.6 117.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0
Skilled 447 750 4.5 4.5 5.2 4.8 113.9 124.4 -0.1 1.1 0.7 0.8
Total 3,210 4,588 3.8 3.5 3.0 3.3 74.4 93.6 1.6 2.1 2.3 2.1
mdg7-db
Unskilled 1,773 2,409 3.5 3.2 2.3 2.8 53.1 70.1 1.8 2.4 2.9 2.6
Semi-Skilled 990 1,429 4.0 3.5 3.2 3.4 94.6 117.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0
Skilled 447 750 4.5 4.5 5.2 4.8 113.9 124.4 -0.1 1.1 0.7 0.8
Total 3,210 4,587 3.8 3.5 3.0 3.3 74.4 93.6 1.6 2.1 2.3 2.1
mdg-fb
Unskilled 1,773 2,321 3.5 3.0 1.8 2.5 53.1 73.9 1.8 2.7 3.6 3.1
Semi-Skilled 990 1,499 4.4 4.1 3.4 3.8 94.6 123.5 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.4
Skilled 447 828 4.4 5.2 6.7 5.8 113.9 140.1 -0.3 2.5 1.7 1.9
Total 3,210 4,648 3.9 3.7 3.1 3.4 74.4 101.7 1.9 2.9 3.1 2.9
mdg-db
Unskilled 1,773 2,270 3.5 2.8 1.5 2.3 53.1 68.5 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.3
Semi-Skilled 990 1,453 4.3 3.9 3.0 3.5 94.6 117.5 2.7 2.3 1.5 2.0
Skilled 447 817 4.4 5.1 6.5 5.6 113.9 134.9 -0.3 2.2 1.2 1.5
Total 3,210 4,541 3.9 3.5 2.8 3.2 74.4 96.1 1.8 2.6 2.3 2.4
* Real values with respect to the CPI. LCU: Dominican Republic Pesos
Employed Employment growth rates Wage growth rates
('000)
Real wages
 ('000 LCU)*
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Table A.7. Results from microsimulations.
2004 2005 2010 2015 2004 2005 2010 2015
BASE U 43.1 42.7 39.3 35.5 0.532 0.530 0.518 0.505
U + S 43.1 42.6 39.4 35.8 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.505
U + S + W1 43.1 42.5 38.6 34.2 0.532 0.528 0.512 0.491
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.0 34.1 27.0 0.532 0.528 0.511 0.489
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.0 33.8 26.7 0.532 0.528 0.511 0.491
MDG2-DB U 43.1 42.6 39.4 35.8 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.504
U + S 43.1 42.7 39.4 36.1 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.505
U + S + W1 43.1 42.6 38.8 34.3 0.532 0.528 0.513 0.491
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.1 34.4 27.2 0.532 0.528 0.512 0.488
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.0 34.3 26.9 0.532 0.528 0.513 0.490
MDG2-FB U 43.1 42.7 38.7 35.6 0.532 0.530 0.517 0.505
U + S 43.1 42.7 38.8 35.7 0.532 0.530 0.517 0.506
U + S + W1 43.1 42.6 38.0 33.6 0.532 0.528 0.510 0.488
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.0 33.3 25.9 0.532 0.528 0.509 0.486
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.0 33.1 25.8 0.532 0.529 0.510 0.488
MDG2-FG U 43.1 42.6 38.8 35.4 0.532 0.530 0.517 0.504
U + S 43.1 42.6 39.0 35.7 0.532 0.530 0.518 0.505
U + S + W1 43.1 42.5 38.2 33.9 0.532 0.528 0.511 0.489
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.0 33.5 26.3 0.532 0.528 0.510 0.487
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.0 33.5 25.9 0.532 0.528 0.511 0.488
MDG2-TAX U 43.1 42.6 38.8 35.2 0.532 0.530 0.516 0.503
U + S 43.1 42.5 38.9 35.5 0.532 0.529 0.517 0.504
U + S + W1 43.1 42.5 38.3 33.8 0.532 0.528 0.511 0.489
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.0 33.5 26.5 0.532 0.528 0.510 0.486
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.0 33.1 26.0 0.532 0.528 0.510 0.488
MDG45-DB U 43.1 42.8 38.9 35.4 0.532 0.530 0.518 0.507
U + S 43.1 42.9 39.0 35.4 0.532 0.530 0.518 0.505
U + S + W1 43.1 42.8 38.9 34.8 0.532 0.529 0.516 0.498
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.3 34.1 26.7 0.532 0.529 0.515 0.496
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.2 42.3 33.9 26.1 0.532 0.528 0.516 0.498
MDG45-FB U 43.1 42.7 38.7 34.3 0.532 0.531 0.518 0.503
U + S 43.1 42.7 38.7 34.3 0.532 0.530 0.517 0.502
U + S + W1 43.1 42.7 38.4 33.5 0.532 0.529 0.514 0.494
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.3 33.5 24.4 0.532 0.529 0.513 0.491
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.2 33.2 23.7 0.532 0.529 0.514 0.493
MDG45-FG U 43.1 42.7 38.7 34.3 0.532 0.530 0.517 0.503
U + S 43.1 42.7 38.8 34.4 0.532 0.530 0.516 0.502
U + S + W1 43.1 42.7 38.4 33.4 0.532 0.528 0.514 0.495
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.1 33.5 24.5 0.532 0.528 0.513 0.493
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.1 33.2 24.2 0.532 0.528 0.513 0.495
MDG45-TAX U 43.1 42.7 38.9 34.4 0.532 0.530 0.518 0.504
U + S 43.1 42.8 38.9 34.5 0.532 0.530 0.518 0.503
U + S + W1 43.1 42.7 38.3 33.8 0.532 0.529 0.514 0.497
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.2 33.5 25.0 0.532 0.529 0.513 0.495
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.2 33.3 24.7 0.532 0.529 0.514 0.497
Note: U=unemployment effect; S=sector effect; W1=relative wages effect; W2=average wage effect; M=skill effect.
EffectScenario Hosehold per capita income Official moderate poverty line
Poverty rate Gini coefficient
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Table A.7 -- cont. Results from microsimulations.
2004 2005 2010 2015 2004 2005 2010 2015
MDG7-DB U 43.1 42.8 39.2 35.6 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.505
U + S 43.1 42.8 39.3 35.8 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.505
U + S + W1 43.1 42.7 38.5 34.3 0.532 0.529 0.512 0.492
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.2 34.2 27.1 0.532 0.529 0.511 0.490
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.2 33.9 26.8 0.532 0.529 0.511 0.492
MDG7-FB U 43.1 42.7 39.3 35.6 0.532 0.530 0.518 0.505
U + S 43.1 42.7 39.3 35.8 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.506
U + S + W1 43.1 42.6 38.6 34.1 0.532 0.529 0.512 0.492
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.2 34.1 26.9 0.532 0.529 0.511 0.489
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.1 33.9 26.6 0.532 0.529 0.512 0.491
MDG7-FG U 43.1 42.7 39.1 35.4 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.504
U + S 43.1 42.7 39.3 35.6 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.505
U + S + W1 43.1 42.6 38.6 33.9 0.532 0.528 0.513 0.491
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.1 34.2 26.8 0.532 0.528 0.512 0.489
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.1 33.9 26.5 0.532 0.528 0.512 0.491
MDG7-TAX U 43.1 42.7 39.4 35.4 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.504
U + S 43.1 42.7 39.4 35.6 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.505
U + S + W1 43.1 42.6 38.7 34.1 0.532 0.529 0.513 0.492
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.1 34.2 26.8 0.532 0.529 0.512 0.490
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.0 34.1 26.6 0.532 0.529 0.513 0.492
MDG-DB U 43.1 42.6 39.1 36.1 0.532 0.530 0.519 0.507
U + S 43.1 42.6 39.1 36.0 0.532 0.529 0.518 0.507
U + S + W1 43.1 42.6 38.7 35.0 0.532 0.528 0.515 0.499
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.1 34.0 27.0 0.532 0.528 0.514 0.497
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.0 33.5 26.5 0.532 0.528 0.514 0.501
MDG-FB U 43.1 42.6 38.5 34.5 0.532 0.530 0.516 0.503
U + S 43.1 42.6 38.4 34.6 0.532 0.530 0.516 0.502
U + S + W1 43.1 42.5 37.9 33.3 0.532 0.529 0.513 0.492
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.0 32.7 23.9 0.532 0.528 0.511 0.490
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 41.9 32.2 23.6 0.532 0.528 0.511 0.492
MDG-FG U 43.1 42.7 38.3 34.5 0.532 0.530 0.516 0.503
U + S 43.1 42.7 38.3 34.6 0.532 0.529 0.515 0.502
U + S + W1 43.1 42.6 37.9 33.3 0.532 0.528 0.512 0.491
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.0 32.7 23.9 0.532 0.528 0.511 0.489
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 41.9 32.4 23.6 0.532 0.527 0.512 0.492
MDG-TAX U 43.1 42.5 38.6 34.5 0.532 0.530 0.517 0.503
U + S 43.1 42.6 38.6 34.5 0.532 0.530 0.517 0.502
U + S + W1 43.1 42.5 38.2 33.3 0.532 0.528 0.513 0.493
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 42.0 33.0 24.6 0.532 0.528 0.512 0.490
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 42.0 32.7 24.0 0.532 0.528 0.513 0.493
Note: U=unemployment effect; S=sector effect; W1=relative wages effect; W2=average wage effect; M=skill effect.
Scenario Effect
Poverty rate Gini coefficient
 Official moderate poverty line Hosehold per capita income
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Table A.8. Decomposition of microsimulation results.
BASE U 43.1 35.5 -7.7 0.532 0.505 -0.027
U + S 43.1 35.8 -7.4 0.29 0.532 0.505 -0.027 0.000
U + S + W1 43.1 34.2 -8.9 -1.55 0.532 0.491 -0.040 -0.014
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 27.0 -16.1 -7.20 0.532 0.489 -0.043 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 26.7 -16.4 -0.30 0.532 0.491 -0.041 0.002
MDG2-DB U 43.1 35.8 -7.4 0.532 0.504 -0.027
U + S 43.1 36.1 -7.1 0.30 0.532 0.505 -0.026 0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 34.3 -8.9 -1.82 0.532 0.491 -0.041 -0.015
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 27.2 -15.9 -7.06 0.532 0.488 -0.043 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 26.9 -16.3 -0.32 0.532 0.490 -0.042 0.001
MDG2-FB U 43.1 35.6 -7.5 0.532 0.505 -0.027
U + S 43.1 35.7 -7.4 0.13 0.532 0.506 -0.026 0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 33.6 -9.5 -2.11 0.532 0.488 -0.044 -0.017
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 25.9 -17.2 -7.68 0.532 0.486 -0.046 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 25.8 -17.3 -0.15 0.532 0.488 -0.044 0.002
MDG2-FG U 43.1 35.4 -7.7 0.532 0.504 -0.028
U + S 43.1 35.7 -7.4 0.30 0.532 0.505 -0.027 0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 33.9 -9.2 -1.81 0.532 0.489 -0.043 -0.016
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 26.3 -16.8 -7.60 0.532 0.487 -0.045 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 25.9 -17.2 -0.37 0.532 0.488 -0.044 0.001
MDG2-TAX U 43.1 35.2 -7.9 0.532 0.503 -0.029
U + S 43.1 35.5 -7.6 0.32 0.532 0.504 -0.028 0.000
U + S + W1 43.1 33.8 -9.3 -1.67 0.532 0.489 -0.043 -0.015
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 26.5 -16.7 -7.37 0.532 0.486 -0.046 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 26.0 -17.1 -0.46 0.532 0.488 -0.044 0.002
MDG45-DB U 43.1 35.4 -7.8 0.532 0.507 -0.025
U + S 43.1 35.4 -7.8 -0.01 0.532 0.505 -0.027 -0.002
U + S + W1 43.1 34.8 -8.4 -0.59 0.532 0.498 -0.033 -0.007
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 26.7 -16.4 -8.03 0.532 0.496 -0.036 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.2 26.1 -17.1 -0.70 0.532 0.498 -0.034 0.001
MDG45-FB U 43.1 34.3 -8.8 0.532 0.503 -0.029
U + S 43.1 34.3 -8.8 0.03 0.532 0.502 -0.030 -0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 33.5 -9.7 -0.87 0.532 0.494 -0.038 -0.009
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 24.4 -18.8 -9.10 0.532 0.491 -0.041 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 23.7 -19.4 -0.65 0.532 0.493 -0.039 0.001
MDG45-FG U 43.1 34.3 -8.8 0.532 0.503 -0.029
U + S 43.1 34.4 -8.7 0.09 0.532 0.502 -0.030 -0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 33.4 -9.7 -0.95 0.532 0.495 -0.037 -0.007
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 24.5 -18.6 -8.94 0.532 0.493 -0.039 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 24.2 -18.9 -0.30 0.532 0.495 -0.037 0.002
MDG45-TAX U 43.1 34.4 -8.7 0.532 0.504 -0.028
U + S 43.1 34.5 -8.6 0.09 0.532 0.503 -0.028 0.000
U + S + W1 43.1 33.8 -9.3 -0.70 0.532 0.497 -0.035 -0.006
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 25.0 -18.1 -8.77 0.532 0.495 -0.037 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 24.7 -18.5 -0.38 0.532 0.497 -0.035 0.002
Note: U=unemployment effect; S=sector effect; W1=relative wages effect; W2=average wage effect; M=skill effect.
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Table A.8 -- cont. Decomposition of microsimulation results.
MDG7-DB U 43.1 35.6 -7.6 0.532 0.505 -0.027
U + S 43.1 35.8 -7.4 0.20 0.532 0.505 -0.027 0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 34.3 -8.9 -1.50 0.532 0.492 -0.040 -0.013
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 27.1 -16.1 -7.19 0.532 0.490 -0.042 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 26.8 -16.3 -0.27 0.532 0.492 -0.040 0.002
MDG7-FB U 43.1 35.6 -7.5 0.532 0.505 -0.027
U + S 43.1 35.8 -7.3 0.20 0.532 0.506 -0.026 0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 34.1 -9.1 -1.75 0.532 0.492 -0.040 -0.014
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 26.9 -16.3 -7.20 0.532 0.489 -0.043 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 26.6 -16.5 -0.26 0.532 0.491 -0.041 0.002
MDG7-FG U 43.1 35.4 -7.7 0.532 0.504 -0.028
U + S 43.1 35.6 -7.5 0.20 0.532 0.505 -0.027 0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 33.9 -9.2 -1.74 0.532 0.491 -0.041 -0.014
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 26.8 -16.4 -7.13 0.532 0.489 -0.043 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 26.5 -16.6 -0.28 0.532 0.491 -0.041 0.002
MDG7-TAX U 43.1 35.4 -7.8 0.532 0.504 -0.028
U + S 43.1 35.6 -7.5 0.26 0.532 0.505 -0.027 0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 34.1 -9.0 -1.50 0.532 0.492 -0.040 -0.013
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 26.8 -16.4 -7.36 0.532 0.490 -0.042 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 26.6 -16.5 -0.14 0.532 0.492 -0.040 0.002
MDG-DB U 43.1 36.1 -7.1 0.532 0.507 -0.025
U + S 43.1 36.0 -7.2 -0.10 0.532 0.507 -0.025 0.000
U + S + W1 43.1 35.0 -8.2 -1.02 0.532 0.499 -0.033 -0.008
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 27.0 -16.1 -7.92 0.532 0.497 -0.035 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 26.5 -16.6 -0.50 0.532 0.501 -0.031 0.004
MDG-FB U 43.1 34.5 -8.6 0.532 0.503 -0.029
U + S 43.1 34.6 -8.6 0.04 0.532 0.502 -0.030 -0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 33.3 -9.9 -1.31 0.532 0.492 -0.040 -0.010
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 23.9 -19.2 -9.37 0.532 0.490 -0.042 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 23.6 -19.5 -0.29 0.532 0.492 -0.040 0.002
MDG-FG U 43.1 34.5 -8.7 0.532 0.503 -0.029
U + S 43.1 34.6 -8.6 0.12 0.532 0.502 -0.030 0.000
U + S + W1 43.1 33.3 -9.8 -1.28 0.532 0.491 -0.041 -0.011
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 23.9 -19.3 -9.42 0.532 0.489 -0.043 -0.003
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 23.6 -19.6 -0.33 0.532 0.492 -0.040 0.003
MDG-TAX U 43.1 34.5 -8.7 0.532 0.503 -0.029
U + S 43.1 34.5 -8.7 0.01 0.532 0.502 -0.030 -0.001
U + S + W1 43.1 33.3 -9.9 -1.19 0.532 0.493 -0.039 -0.009
U + S + W1 + W2 43.1 24.6 -18.5 -8.69 0.532 0.490 -0.042 -0.002
U + S + W1 + W2 + M 43.1 24.0 -19.1 -0.62 0.532 0.493 -0.039 0.003
Note: U=unemployment effect; S=sector effect; W1=relative wages effect; W2=average wage effect; M=skill effect.
Total 
change
Marginal 
change
 Official moderate poverty line Hosehold per capita income
Scenario Effect
Poverty rate Gini coefficient
2004 2015
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